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by Simon Kuznets
I
THIS iS the fourth in a Series of monographs resulting from an inquiry
initiated by the National Bureau of Economic Research in 1950,
with the financial assistance of the Life Insurance Association of
America.' The inquiry examines long-term trends in capital forma-
tion and financing in the United States, and is organized primarily
about the principal capital-using sectors of the economy—agricul-
ture, mining, manufacturing, the public utilities, residential real
estate, and governments. The analysis for each sector summarizes
the major trends in real capital formation from 1870 (or the earliest
year for which data are available), and in financing from 1900,
or somewhat earlier. In each, an effort is also made to discover the
factors determining these trends, and, so far as possible, to suggest
the significance of these factors for the future. In addition to the
sector studies, the inquiry comprises two others. One deals with
trendsinexternalfinancing channeled through intermediate
financial institutions and attempts to link the major types of institu-
tions with the various groups of capital users. The second integrates
the results of all the other studies, within a framework provided by
country-wide estimates of national product and relevant components,
and of country-wide estimates of assets and debts.
Some of the findings have been presented in part or in preliminary
form in a series of Occasional and Technical Papers.2 This mono-
graph, like those to follow, presents the full results of a specific
study together with supporting data. The three others, near com-
pletion, deal with trends in capital formation and financing in
mining and manufacturing, and in governments, respectively; and
1Thefirst three monographs are: Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate: Trends
and Prospects, by Leo Grebler, David M. Blank, and Louis Winnick (1956); Capital in
Agriculture: Its Formation and Financing since 1870, by Alvin S. Tostlebe (1957), and Financial'
Intermediaries in the American Economy since 1900, by Raymond W. Goldsmith (1958), all
published for the National Bureau of Economic Research by Princeton University Press.
2LeoGrebler, The Role of Federal Credit Aids in Residential Construction, Occasional
Paper 39 (1953); Daniel Creamer, Capital and Output Trends in Manufacturing Industries,
1880—1948, Occasional Paper 41(1954); Raymond W. Goldsmith, The Share of Financial
Intermediaries in National Wealth and National Assets, 1900—1949, Occasional Paper 42 (1954);
MelvilleJ. Ulmer, Trends and Cycles in Cap ital Formation by United States Railroads, 1870—1950,
Occasional Paper 43 (1954); Alvin S. Tostlebe, The Growth of Physical Capital in Agriculture,
1870—1950, Occasional Paper 44 (1954);Israel Borenstein, Capital and Output Trends Ia
Mining Industries, 1870—1948, Occasional Paper 45 (1954); David M. Blank, The Volume
of Residential Construction, 1889—1950, Technical Paper 9 (1954);all published by the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
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with a summary presentation and analysis of trends in capital
formation and financing for the country as a whole.
II
The regulated industries, whose long-term record is analyzed in
Dr. Ulmer's monograph, have a number of distinctive characteristics.
At the risk of repeating the obvious, it may be useful to list them briefly.
First, most regulated industries are products of modern technology
—of new ways of providing energy for industrial and household
uses, of harnessing energy to the transportation of goods and persons
and to the communication of messages, written and oral. Many of
these industries could not have existed a hundred or a hundred and
fifty years ago because neither the practical inventions, nor even the
theoretical discoveries underlying their operation, were known.
Second, because of the large volume of concentrated power
involved in the modern technology of regulated industries, they
require—forminimal operation—hugeinvestmentsof durable
capital: in roadbeds or roadways, terminal stations and airfields,
power equipment, transmission lines, control stations,etc.For
optimum economical operation such durable capital investment must
be even larger relative to current rates of output—to exploit the
internal economies of large-scale production and to provide for the
secular rise in demand.
Third, since so many of the regulated industries are concerned
with transportation and communication, the efficiency of their
output depends upon a rapid integration of local and regional units
into a country-wide—and sometimes international—network. A
single railroad is far less effective economically than one which is
part of a country-wide system; and the same can be said of a single
truck company, air transport company, or telephone firm, unless, of
course, each is already so large as to be able to provide effective
integrated service throughout the country. Hence, once such a
transportation or communication industry emerges, it is under great
pressure to extend its network—and thus its capital investment—
to cover the country; and perhaps link up with similar industries in
other countries.
Fourth, the large size of durable capital investment relative to
current output makes for a high ratio of fixed to variable costs—and
leads to the classical case where, in the long run, competition within
the industry ends in monopoly by killing off all competitors but one.
By their very structure as producers, many regulated industries are
naturally monopolistic.
xFOREWORD
Fifth, since the industries in the group are in the business of
supplying power and other necessities (like water), or of providing
transportation and communication services, the products constitute
a basic framework for much of economic and social life. All of us
need the products; and their availability, once established, permits
changes in the pattern of life designed to take advantage of them
(e.g. of new transportation facilities). The consequence is that the
withdrawal of the products of regulated industries, an interruption
in their supply, would create severe and widely ramifying difficulties
throughout the country's economy.In other words, regulated
industries are suppliers of goods that can be viewed practically as
basic necessities.
Sixth, it is, of course, this combination of monopolistic position
and provision of necessities that results in the industries' being
regulated—treated as public utilities5—in countries where nationali-
zation can be avoided. Were the industries concerned with minor
luxuries, such as artificial hair buns or fancy cigarette holders, few
would care about the monopolistic power of the producers—where
the latter happened to possess them. If the goods were necessities,
but the industry naturally competitive (as with many agricultural
and industrial products), reliance could be placed on the free
competitive market and little special regulation would be required.
A public utility must be regulated for the joint reason that, as the
term implies, it is of wide and basic use, and yet its technology and
economics bar the possibility of effective intra-industry competition.
Finally, even though the degree of monopoly is high within each
regulated industry, in the long-term perspective one can observe a
great deal of inter-industry competition.Surely the railroads have
been affected in recent decades by the competition of motor trucks
and of airplanes;electric power competes for certain types of
household use with gas; there is even competition, limited though it
may be, between the telephone and telegraph. Indeed, it may be
suggested that the very origin of regulated industries in recent
technical progress and the wide field which. they cover raise the
probability that,as time passes, competitive pressure on some
already existing industries will be exercised by newly emerging
methods of providing power, transportation, or communication
services—methods so new as to provide a base for new industries.
And one may add that as such new industries are born, and exercise
Dr. Ulmer's definition of regulated industries embraces a group somewhat wider
than public utilities, bu& sufficiently close to it to say that by far the predominant part
of the group are privately owned public utilities. (Government-owned units are excluded
by Dr. Ulmer from the analysis; but in many of the subsectors, government ownership
in this country is insignificant.)
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competitive pressure on those already existing, the new sectors—
even though still undergoing internal competition—may promptly
be subjected to special controls and thus be added to the regulated
group.
III
The characteristics just listed go far to explain the long-term
movements of output, capital formation, capital-output ratios, and
sources of financing, which are so clearly portrayed and cogently
analyzed in Dr. Ulmer's monograph. His main conclusions can be
briefly stated.
(1) As each of the major industries with which Dr. Ulmer deals
separately (steam railroads, electric light and power, telephones,
street and electric railways, local bus lines) emerges, its output
grows at high rates—far higher than those in country-wide output. As
a result, its share in total national output also rises rapidly. The steam
railroads, much of whose early growth preceded the period covered
here, accounted for about 5 per cent of gross national product in
1886 (their share in the 1830's must have been nearly zero), and
rose to almost 9 per cent by the early 1920's. Electric light and power,
whose share was close to zero in the early 1890's, rose to over 4 per
cent of gross national product in the 1950's; the share of telephones,
from close to zero in the early 1890's to over 1.5 per cent in the
1950's; and that of street and electric railways, which emerged in
the 1890's, to a peak of about 1.4 per cent in 19l6. But such rapid
growth—greatly in excess even of the vigorous growth of national
output—ceases, after some decades. The timing differs from one
industry to another, depending upon its scope and its susceptibility
to competitive pressure from new industries. From a peak level in
the early 1920's of 9 per cent of gross national product, the share of
steam railroads drops to 5 per cent by 1950; that of street and
electric railways declines from 1.4 per cent in 1916 to 0.2 in 1950;
and even for those industries that are still growing relatively
vigorously, such as electric light and power and telephones, the
rise in share of total output, rapid at first, slows down materially.
This pattern of a life cycle of growth of output in the regulated
industries is clearly associated with their origin: their emergence
as a product of a major technological change which, as Dr. Ulmer
points out, fills the vacuum of a felt need, of a wide potential market.
The improvements that follow soon upon the introduction of the
new technology, and the pressure on transportation and com-
munication to build quickly toward an integrated country-wide
'Allof these figures are from Tables 22 and 23 in the monograph.
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framework, provide the continuous stimulus to a high rate of growth.
in the early phases of the industry's history. Then, as the national
network is completed, as the original need is gradually satisfied, and
as competitive pressures arise because of new technological changes,
the rate of growth diminishes; and in some cases absolute and
relative declines may set in.
(2) The long-term trends in capital formation are similar to the
trends in output in that high rates of growth prevail in the early
phases and then retardation begins. Plant and equipment grew in
the regulated industries at rates averaging over 30 per cent per
decade for the period from 1870 to 1910; but at a rate averaging
oniy about 10 per cent per decade for the period from 1910 to 1950
(see Table 5). Net additions to durable capital of public utilities
accounted for well over a fifth of all additions to durable capital in
1880—90; probably appreciably less than that in the earlier decades;
about a fifth for the period 1880—1912; but less than a tenth for the
period 1912—48. in other words, capital formation in the regulated
industries, like output, first grew more rapidly than that for the
nation and then declined materially as a share of the national total.
This finding—that the trend pattern of capital formation reproduces
that of output but in a magnified fashion and within a shorter time
span—was to be expected. For the capital plant had to be built in
advance of prospective demand and output, and as the technology
became stabilized and the turbulent growth of output itself slowed
down, higher rates of utilization and capital-saving economies made
it possible to reduce the rate of growth of capital investment even
more than the rate of growth of output was reduced.
(3) This relation between growth of output and of capital forma-
tion is reflected most clearly in the trends of the capital-output
ratios. Among regulated industries the ratios of capital to output,
which in most cases were much higher than for the country as a
whole, have declined precipitously—if not from the very beginning,
then from not long after the industry's birth. In steam railroads the
ratio declined from about 16 in 1880 to less than 3 in the 1950's; in
electric light and power, from 16 and more in the early 1890's to
less than 2 in the 1950's; in telephones, from 4 or 5 in the 1890's to
less than 2 in the 1950's; and in street and electric railways, from
about 7 at the end of the 1890's to less than 3 in the 1950's (all of
these figures from Charts 17 through 20 in the monograph). It is
clear that the very large volume of durable capital investment,
relative to current output, which was required in the regulated
industries—particularly during the early phases of extensive growth
and construction of the networks—provided the opportunity and
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the incentive for reducing the capital-output ratio, so that the
resulting reductions were greater, both absolutely and relatively,
than in most other industries in the country.
(4) The rate of growth of gross capital formation fell markedly
from the high levels of the early decades—partly because of the
slowing down in the rate of growth of output, and even more because
of rising rates of utilization of capacity and of capital-saving in-
novations. But this meant that the ratio of capital depreciation to
current capital formation would, all other conditions being equal,
grow; and as Dr. Ulmer demonstrates, growth in the ratio of
depreciation to gross investment was a major factor contributing to
striking long-term changes in the sources of financing. Whereas in
the early decades financing was almost wholly from external sources
and came largely from new issues of stocks and bonds, in the later
decades internal financing—retained profits and especially deprecia-
tion charges—loomed much larger; in some industries, such as
steam railroads, dominating the picture completely. True, other
factors were involved; and we must always consider the effect of price
changes, in scanning movements of capital formation in constant
dollars to infer trends in sources of financing. But even some of these
other factors—for example, changes in the future prospects of the
industry which clearly affect its chances of securing external funds
in long-term capital markets—are, like the growing ratio of capital
depreciation to gross capital investment, aspects of the life cycle
pattern of growth traceable to the distinctive characteristics of the
regulated industries.
(5) Finally, attention must be called to the long swings that so
clearly characterized capital formation in the regulated industries—
particularly insteamrailroads, whose record is the longest. The
association between them and long swings in other important
aspects of the economy is discussed in detail in Chapter 7 of the
monograph. In the present context, it is important to stress that
many of the regulated industries provide consumer goods and
should, in general, be quite sensitive to population movements;
and additions to the durable capital in them, like additions to
residential housing, should be responsive to additions to population
and to internal migration. Given the long swings in additions to
population and in internal migration, it is this association that may
be at the root of long swings in capital formation in the regulated
industries.
Two comments should be added to this too-brief summary of
Dr. Ulmer's findings. First, the trend patterns in output, capital
formation, capital-output ratios, and sources of financing—as well
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as the susceptibility to long swings—that are so clearly apparent in
the regulated industries can be found also in many other sectors.
New industries, emerging as a result of new technological changes,
are likely to go through similar life cycles of output, capital formation,
capital-output ratios, and sources of financing; and if they happen
to be responsive to population changes, may also show long swings.
But because of the distinctive characteristics of regulated industries,
these trend and long-term movements stand out with special
prominence, and possibly provide a clearer insight into the causal
mechanisms that bring them about.
Second, regulated industries are a category that includes sub-
sectors at different stages of growth, and hence at different phases of
their life cycle pattern. Any attempt at projection of the future from
the past must, as Dr. Ulmer clearly shows, take account of this
diversity of behavior within the group; and particularly of the
possibility that the scope of the group will be expanded in the future
by the addition of new industries, now in their very early stages or
still to be born. It is the difficulty of appraising the potentials of the
future with respect not only to the industry already existing and
with clearly observable trends, but as well to new industries in the
making, that renders projection so hazardous. And the rapidity of
change, the short period of two to three decades in which an
industry could grow, in the past, to unprecedented importance, is a
warning that should be given due weight in avoiding oversimplified
projection from the record.
Iv
The comments above can hardly do justice to the analytical frame-
work and to the empirical foundation of Dr. Ulmer's monograph.
The intention here is to provide a brief view of the findings, and to
introduce the reader to an intriguing account of long-term move-
ments in capital and output in an important and distinctive sector
of our economy. Even a brief glance at the discussion will reveal the
variety of analytical suggestions advanced to account for the
findings; and skimming through the appendixes will indicate the
time-consuming effort that has been made to organize the under-
lying statistical data. One can trust that the data, findings, and
hypotheses will be quickly absorbed in the stream of current work
and thinking on economic problems; and thereby contribute to more
reasoned views of them and so, hopefully, to more intelligent
solutions.
xv